Parsimonious legal framework and parliamentarians’ reluctance to utilise their powers have impeded parliamentary oversight of police work. Hence, the parliament does not have a significant role in building police integrity in Serbia.

By Katarina Djokić (BCSP) 

Recommendations

1. It is necessary to fulfil three recommendations in order to fulfil this role of Parliament in building police integrity in Serbia.
2. The new Law on the Police should define the competences and powers of the National Assembly in the oversight of the Ministry of Interior and the Police. It should also enable the internal control body to directly address the National Assembly in cases it cannot duly conduct investigations. The Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly should more precisely regulate how Defence and Internal Affairs Committee should oversee the police work.
3. The parliamentarians should be educated and encouraged to more actively use their oversight powers.
4. The lack of parliamentary staff supporting oversight activities could be compensated by engaging external experts and strengthening cooperation with independent state institutions (such as Ombudsman).

Introduction

Parliamentary oversight is a key factor in building police integrity. Parliament, as directly elected body, provides all government institutions and public agencies, including the police, with mandate and powers – as well as the budget – to provide public services.[1] Therefore, parliament should ensure that police work protects citizens’ interest by providing them maximum safety at the best possible cost. By overseeing the police, parliament is supposed to detect and prevent abuse and arbitrary behaviour, to hold the government (more concretely, the minister of interior) accountable in regard to how taxpayers’ money is used, improve transparency of police operations and enhance public trust in the police.[2] Therefore, by exercising their oversight powers, i.e. probing into the police practice, addressing the issues they note and providing solutions for those issues (either through legislation or providing recommendations to the Ministry of Interior), parliamentarians could give vital contribution to rendering the police less susceptible for corruption, more professional and more likely to adequately respond to its tasks.

What can parliamentarians do?

The National Assembly of Serbia oversees the Police mainly through the work of the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee. The Defence and Internal Affairs Committee has several possibilities for oversight of the Police at disposal. Its most important instrument for exercising oversight is review of the reports by the Ministry of Interior (MoI). The Committee is tasked to review regular reports submitted by the Minister of Interior on the MoI’s work and the state of security in Serbia.[3] Apart from regular reports, the Committee is entitled to request additional reports on various issues pertaining to the MoI’s work.[4] The Committee has an explicit power to request reports on work of the Internal Affairs Sector.[5] Even though it is the Minister rather than head of the Internal Affairs Sector that should submit such report, this is still a good opportunity for linking internal control and external oversight of the Police.

Furthermore, the Committee can organise public hearings on important issues. The Committee is also entitled to engage experts or organisations[6] with particular knowledge of the police in its work, which could help it obtain alternative assessments of the police integrity.

Thereby the Committee has all the basic oversight instruments at disposal – albeit those instruments tend to “lack precision”, as it will be discussed later in the text. On the other hand, the Committee does not have some specific powers present in the best European practices, such as visits and inspections on the field and investigation of petitions[7], which would enable more vigorous oversight.

What has been done so far?

In reality, the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee has been rather idle in oversight of the MoI and, especially, the Police. Vast majority of its sessions have been dedicated to its legislative tasks: at 22 out of 30 Committee sessions held in the current convocation[8] the Committee discussed proposed laws or amendments to laws.

Even in the course of exercising their legislative tasks the Committee members tend to passively respond to the Government’s proposals rather than examine how to amend legislation to address deficiencies in the police integrity. A reason for that might be their lack of awareness on such deficiencies: for instance, in the convocation 2012-2014 the Committee had only one opportunity to review a report on the MoI’s work. On the other hand, in the current convocation such reports have been reviewed regularly[9], yet it appears that the MoI informs parliamentarians mostly on crime statistics, avoiding to present information on human and financial resource management, procurement, methods applied in the police work, or findings of the Internal Affairs Sector. In fact, in March 2015 report on the work of Internal Affairs Sector of the Police was requested for the first time since adoption of the current Law on Police (2005). The Committee has not used the legally anchored opportunity to request any other additional reports by the MoI. It has also seldom occurred that Committee sessions were summoned in response to on-going issues. In the current convocation, two such sessions were held so far. One was dedicated to report by the MoI and MoD on the heavy flooding which affected Serbia in May 2014 and measures employed to save the population and defend the threatened areas, whereas at the other session the Committee discussed violent acts against ethnic minorities in Vojvodina[10]. However, at none of these sessions did the Committee discuss the work of the MoI itself, i.e. whether the response of the MoI to the aforementioned problems was satisfactory, what obstacles were encountered, which resources were missing and what could have been improved.

Neither in this or in any of the previous convocations was proposed budget for the Ministry of Interior reviewed. The State Audit Institution’s (SAI) reports on the audit of the MoI’s financial reports for 2010 and 2012 were never discussed by parliamentarians, nor was this the case with the SAI’s performance auditing findings from 2014 regarding the use of official vehicles in the Ministry of Interior – despite the fact that these findings show significant inconsistencies between officially recorded and actual use of vehicles in the MoI.[11]

Another potential oversight instrument, public hearing, has never been used by Defence and Internal Affairs Committee so far.

What are the obstacles to the effective oversight?

There are legal and practical obstacles to establishing regular and effective parliamentary oversight of the MoI and the Police.

The Law on the Police is utterly parsimonious in defining what parliamentary oversight of the police should entail. This is especially blatant when its provisions regarding parliamentary oversight are compared to those offered by the Law on the Bases Regulating Security Services Organization in the Republic of Serbia, which explicitly state what the committee in charge of security services is to oversee. This entails implementation of special investigative measures, financial management and respect of political neutrality in the security services’ work.[12]

Not only would reviewing the use of SIM by the police increase its accountability and strengthen human rights protection, but it would also help identify gaps and obstacExternal les to effective policing. For instance, a research by BCSP has found that courts do not tend to order engagement of undercover police officers. This begs for a question if the Police has sufficient resources to carry out undercover operations and protect its employees.

Even oversight by reviewing the MoI’s regular reports is hampered by the fact that it is not defined what such reports are expected to contain. Since they tend to be solely focused on crime and traffic safety, they do not provide parliamentarians with information necessary to assess the MoI’s efforts towards integrity building.A particularly concerning deficiency of the Law on the Police is that it does not explicitly foresee parliamentary oversight of implementation of special investigative measures. The unlawful or inappropriate use of SIM leads to excessive and unjustified violation of citizens’ rights and therefore this field of police work should be subject to regular oversight. Another obstacle to oversight in this regard is the fact that the Defence and Internal Affair Committee’s competences are only generally defined in the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly.[13] The Committee is not explicitly obliged to scrutinise the work of the MoI or the Police. In fact, an overview of its tasks suggests the Committee has prevailingly got legislative and deliberative functions, while its oversight function is limited to reviewing regular reports. As a consequence, members of the National Assembly (MPs) may not even be aware how they could exercise oversight and what aspects of the MoI’s/Police work they could oversee. For instance, in an interview with BCSP researchers a Committee member expressed uncertainty whether the Committee was allowed at all to scrutinise the use of special investigative measures (SIM) by the police.[14] Such uncertainty has resulted in fact that the implementation of SIM by the police has never been subject of parliamentary oversight.[15]

Another significant issue is the lack of possibility for the Internal Affairs Sector of the Police to directly address the National Assembly i.e. the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee. This is particularly risky since the Internal Affairs Sector is not sufficiently independent from the Minister, who can always prevent an investigation conducted by the Sector and assign it to another police unit.[16] Therefore, a possibility for the Internal Affairs Sector to directly address the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee in cases it deems it is necessary would not only boost external oversight of the MoI and the Police, but also strengthen integrity of the internal control. Such legislative solution would not pose a novelty in Serbia: at the moment, internal control units of military security and intelligence agencies are already entitled to approach the Security Services Control Committee in cases when they suspect that heads of the agencies have not acted upon reported irregularities.[17]

Theory suggests that in political systems in transition parliamentarians are uneasy and uncertain about their role in overseeing the security sector. In addition, the willingness of parliamentarians to scrutinise the security sector can also be hampered by party politics.[19] Analysis of Serbian parliamentary practice has shown that in this regard Serbia very much follows the recognised patterns. Members of the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee have often appeared as if they sought to work side by side with the MoI in solving security challenges rather than scrutinise its work. Discussion during the Committee sessions has often switched from issues to personal clashes between representatives of the governing and the opposition parties. Furthermore, overview of available materials indicates many MPs are not motivated to regularly attend the Committee sessions.[20]

MPs tend to lack adequate knowledge, too. In the previous convocation, this problem was exacerbated by relatively frequent shifts of the Committee members. Forty per cent of the previous Committee members and deputy members (the last constitution) were not re-elected in 2014, whereas 10 out of 34 current members and deputy members are serving their first mandate as MPs with no previous experience in the MoI.[21] It takes time for each MP to become familiar with both their powers and the work of the MoI, which affects the Committee’s work. It ought to be noted that MPs do not have aides who would brief them on particular subject, whereas the Committee has only a modest number of staff at disposal. The Committee does have a possibility to engage external experts in its work, but this possibility has never been used so far.

What can be improved?

The new law on the police is an opportunity to establish effective parliamentary oversight of the police. It should foresee that the competent committee reviews not only reports on the state of security, but also reports on the work of the MoI and the police.

• It would be advantageous to more precisely define competences of the committee in charge of overseeing the MoI (e.g. oversight of spending, lawfulness of the police work, etc.).
• It is particularly important to provide for parliamentary oversight of SIM implementation by the police. Possibility of oversight visits to police units applying SIM should be considered. This could be regulated in in accordance with the example set in the oversight of security services in Serbia.
• Internal Affairs Sector should be given a possibility to directly address the National Assembly, i.e. the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee in cases when it assesses it is unduly prevented from conducting investigations or when its recommendations are not implemented.

The Rules of Procedure should be amended to more precisely define competences and powers of the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee in the oversight of the MoI and the police. They should also specify which committee is responsible for the oversight of the SIM implementation by the police, so that such oversight could finally be established.

Exhaustive legislation does not guarantee effective oversight if parliamentarians themselves are not prepared to exercise it. Hence, it is vital to educate and encourage them to use their powers. In particular:

• They should be encouraged to demand special reports on various topics, such as measures undertaken to increase police integrity and human resource management in the MoI/police.
• The Defence and Internal Affairs Committee should strengthen its oversight of finances and material resource management in the MoI. It could start by reviewing the SAI performance auditing findings on the use of official vehicles in the MoI. The Committee should also discuss proposed budgets and procurement plans, as well as quarterly reports on executed procurement. From 2015 on, the Government has obligation to inform the National Assembly about planned procurement in the field of defence and security (confidential procurement).[22] Furthermore, the MoI will be compelled to submit annual reports to the National Assembly on the executed procurement of this kind.[23] This will pose another opportunity for the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee to scrutinize the MoI’s efforts towards integrity building.

Insufficient number of the Committee’s staff and absence of parliamentarian’s personal aides could be compensated by engaging external experts who could provide useful inputs for overseeing the police. Organising public hearings on particular issues are another way to gain useful insights.

The Defence and Internal Affairs Committee would surely profit from establishing cooperation with independent state institutions: Ombudsman, Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Personal Data Protection (Commissioner), State Audit Institution and Anti-Corruption Agency of Serbia (ACAS). This would enable it to monitor the MoI and the police work by relying on expertise of these bodies in particular fields. For instance, the ACAS is monitoring implementation of integrity plans in public institutions, including the MoI, so that its findings would be a valuable asset for the Committee. The Commissioner is from 2015 on responsible for gathering evidence on requests for access to retained data submitted to telecommunications providers – this entails evidence for the police.[24] Cooperation between parliamentarians and independent state institutions would thus make parliamentary oversight more efficient and more effective; moreover it would strengthen the overall external oversight of the MoI.

Other oversight mechanisms — Individual parliamentarians who are not members of the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee are not fully deprived of powers to oversee the Police. They are entitled to pose parliamentary questions to the Minister of Interior. Parliamentary questions are an excellent way to demand information on particular issues, such as human resources policy, public procurement and management of public funds or deployment of police units for specific purposes. However, this instrument has been seldom utilised to put the MoI’s work under scrutiny. Moreover, the MoI has not regularly responded to parliamentary questions, which could be explained by its limited capacities to provide information of public importance, but also by lack of sanctions for not responding to parliamentarians.[25]

In case of systematic failures or suspected abuse the National Assembly could set up inquiry committees or commissions[26], which are tasked to clarify problematic issues and provide recommendations how to overcome those.[27] Whereas inquiry committees are not supposed to be an instrument for regular oversight, they do emerge as an adequate tool in case serious problems violating integrity of the Police or the MoI are detected. Nonetheless, inquiry committees have been extremely rare in Serbian parliamentary practice so far[28]. Despite a number of affairs related to the police in previous years there was no initiative to set up an inquiry committee. This could be put down to lack of motivation among parliamentarians.[29] Another problem is the fact that the Rules of Procedure do not foresee how inquiry committees/commissions are set up, i.e. what the minimum number of parliamentarians or caucuses that have to propose setting up an inquiry committee/commission is.

Sources

• Poslovnik Narodne skupštine Republike Srbije [Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia]. “Sl. glasnik RS”, 52/2010 and 13/2011.
• Zakon o elektronskim komunikacijama [Law on Electronic Communications] “Sl. glasnik RS”, 44/2010, 60/2013 – decision by the Constitutional Court, and 62/2014.
• Zakon o javnim nabavkama [Public Procurement Law]. “Sl. glasnik RS”, 124/2012 and 14/2015.
• Zakon o Narodnoj skupštini [Law on the National Assembly]. “Sl. glasnik RS”, 9/2010.
• Zakon o osnovama uređenja službi bezbednosti Republike Srbije [The Law on the Bases Regulating Security Services Organization in the Republic of Serbia]. “Sl. glasnik RS”, 116/2007 and 72/2012.
• Zakon o policiji [Law on the Police]. “Sl. glasnik RS”, 101/2005, 63/2009 – decision by the Constitutional Court, and 92/2011.
• Zakon o Vojnobezbednosnoj agenciji i Vojnoobaveštajnoj agenciji [Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency]. “Sl. glasnik RS”, 88/2009, 55/2012 decision by the Constitutional Court, and 17/2013.

Endnote

[1] See: Wills, A. et al. Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence Agencies in the European Union (Brussels: European Parliament, 2011): 41.

[2] Compare: Yamamoto, H. (Ed.) Tools for Parliamentary Oversight. (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2007): 9.

[3] Law on the Police, Art. 9. and Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, Art. 49.  The Law foresees that reports are submitted annually, but in practice they are prepared on quarterly basis.

[4] Law on the Police, Art. 9.

[5] Law on the Police, Art. 179.

[6] Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly, Art. 43. and Art. 74. Para. 5.

[7] See: Fuior, T. Parliamentary Powers in Security Sector Governance. (Geneva: DCAF, 2011): 8. However, there has been interpretation among Committee members themselves that the Committee was supposed to deliberate petitions and complaints regarding police work submitted to the National Assembly (for instance, this was told to BCSP researchers by the Committee member Momir Stojanovic – Interview with Momir Stojanovic MP, held in Niš, March 2014)

[8] In the period from May 8, 2014 until March 24, 2015.

[9] In July 2014, November 2014 and March 2015.

[10] In the aftermath of the incident during the football match between Serbia and Albania.

[11] Državna revizorska institucija [State Audit Institution]. Izveštaj o reviziji svrsishodnosti – upravljanje službenim vozilima direktnih korisnika budžeta Republike Srbije [Report on Performance Audit – Official Vehicles Management by Direct Budgetary Beneficiaries in the Republic of Serbia] (Belgrade: State Audit Institution, 2014): 47.

[12] Law on the Bases Regulating Security Services Organization in the Republic of Serbia, Art. 16.

[13] In the Article 49.

[14] Interview with Momir Stojanovic MP, held in Niš, March 2014.

[15] In fact, the Security Services Control Committee has considered the possibility of extending its competences to the oversight of SIM implementation by the Police, but this has ended in a stalemate, since there is no legislative provision enabling this Committee to do so.

[16] Law on the Police, Art. 177. Para. 3.

[17] Law on Military Security Agency and Military Intelligence Agency, Art. 57.

[18] Nacrt Zakona o policiji [Draft Law on the Police], Art. 5. Available at: http://www.mup.gov.rs/cms_lat/sadrzaj.nsf/Prednacrt_ZOP.h.

[19] European Parliament – Office for Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy. Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector. (Brussels, 2013): 60.

[20] More on this issue in: Djokic, K. and V. Erceg. Parliamentary Oversight and Integrity Building in Security Institutions. (Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2014): 30-31. Available at: http://bezbednost.org/All-publications/5589/Parliamentary-Oversight-and-Integrity-Building-in.shtml.

[21] One MP was previously serving as a state secretary in the MoI.

[22] Public Procurement Law, Art. 127, Para. 5.

[23] Regarding the fact that the necessary Government’s regulation on confidential procurement was only passed in summer 2014, the first annual report, for 2015, is due by March 31, 2016. This obligation is set in the Public Procurement Law, Art. 131.

[24] Law on Electronic Communications, Art. 130a. Para. 4.

[25] More on this topic in: Erceg, V. Parliamentary Questions as a Mechanism for Oversight of the Security Sector. (Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2014). Available at: http://bezbednost.org/All-publications/5590/Parliamentary-Questions-as-a-Mechanism-for.shtml.

[26] Committees are foreseen to involve only MPs, while commissions should include external experts, too.

[27] Rules of Procedure, Art. 68.

[28] There was only one set up in the convocation 2012-2014 and none in the current convocation.

[29] Interviews conducted with MPs by BCSP researchers in the period 2013-2014 indicate that many of them do not expect they could actually call the executive to account.