Serbia need to achieve full harmonisation with the best European practices in this area of justice, freedom and security until 2020.

By Bojan Elek (BCSP) / Photo: European Commission
@BojanElek

Serbia has opened negotiations on Chapter 24 on justice, freedom and security in July 2016, two and a half years after the formal opening of the membership negotiations with the EU. All these issues pertain to the country’s internal affairs, upon which citizens’ safety depends on, as well as their personal sense of whether they live in a country that is just and protects their freedoms.

With the view to preparing for opening the negotiations on Chapter 24, the Serbian Ministry of Interior (MoI), as the coordinating institution over 49 different state bodies and entities, managed to successfully finalise a tremendous work. The process of analytical screening of the harmonisation with the EU standards within this Chapter has been completed. Moreover, several rounds of consultations with the civil society were organised in the process of drafting of the Action Plan for Chapter 24. This document, in its fifth and final version, was approved by the European Commission and subsequently adopted by the Serbian Government. Finally, a Joint Negotiating Position on Chapter 24 has been agreed upon and presented on 18 of July, on the day when the negotiations on this chapter were officially opened.

The act of opening the chapter, although undisputedly important, is first and foremost a political event. The essence of the chapter is actually contained within the process that awaits Serbia after the opening of the negotiations or, more precisely, until 2020 which is the year that the Serbian Government decided to pick as the final date to achieve full harmonisation with the best European practices in this area (with the exception of acceding to the Schengen Convention, which takes place after Serbia is granted a full membership).

What are the benefits for citizens?

By harmonising with the European acquis communautaire contained and the best practices contained in Chapter 24, Serbia will be able to become a part of the European security community. Nowadays, when the security threats know no state boundaries and, to a great extent, push to the limits the national state’s ability to tackle them, cooperation is the only way to achieve results. By implementing reforms under Chapter 24, citizens may expect a number of positive changes.

• In the area of fighting organised crime, the law enforcement agencies will raise their capacities to conduct complex investigations, including the financial ones, which will allow for a better identification of the assets derived from criminal activity. By doing this, it is not only that the social damage inflicted by the criminal activity is mitigated, but there exists a possibility to use these assets to compensate the victims of these criminal acts.

• Reforms in the area of judicial cooperation in civil matters will make it possible for the citizens of Serbia to enjoy legal protection in all of the EU member states. This is especially important in cases that deal with inheritance, divorce or child custody when the parents are citizens of different countries. Furthermore, mutual legal assistance pertaining to the court evidence, as well as the enforcement of foreign judgements, will offer legal guarantees to the foreign companies that they will enjoy legal protection in Serbia in line with the EU standards in this area.

• The very way in which police operates will also be the subject of comprehensive reforms. Namely, instead of working mostly in a reactive and repressive manner, a shift towards intelligence-lead policing will take place, which will allow better prevention and more efficacious utilization of the limited resources that are at disposal to the Serbian police. In addition, the police will cooperate with EU member states’ police forces much more effectively and to a greater extent. This means a better availability and greater exchange of information, but direct operational police cooperation on concrete cases as well.

Although the above-mentioned list is not exhaustive and makes up only a small portion of the planned reforms, it appears that the reform plans are ambitious and deadlines are short. This is why it is of utmost importance that the role of all actors, both those involved in the reform process and those who monitor and assess it, is to ensure that the reforms are implemented in the most effective manner possible and to make sure they are sustainable.

Why Cannot Serbia do it by itself?

Those who are apathetic regarding the European integration process may ask why Serbia does not make these improvements on its own. In all truth, the changes that are expected in the EU accession process are, first and foremost, important for the citizens of Serbia. However, there are a great many reasons why Serbia cannot implement all of the planned activities on its own. These are a lack of resources, insufficient knowledge and decade-long resistance to change, to name just a few.

Serbia cannot afford the reforms on its own

It is a fact that the reforms cost money. It is a conservative estimate that the implementation of the Action Plan for Chapter 24 will cost north of 27.25 million Euros, with the tendency to grow. This sum only covers the direct expenses financed from the state budget, namely the direct cost to the Serbian tax payers. Much more generous funding is made available through the EU’s Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA funds). For instance, in IPA for 2016, for the first time, direct sectorial budgetary assistance for the MoI was enabled.

The total sum of 27.4 million Euros was earmarked for the purposes of integrated border management. Moreover, various bilateral donors provide additional funds through their international development assistance programs directed at specific policy areas. For example, Sweden has donated 8 million Euros within the framework of the “Development of the Serbian MoI” project for the period 2016-2018, for the strategic management and comprehensive management of the EU accession process within the Ministry.

Serbia does not know how to do it on its own

The policies contained within Chapter 24 are comprised of best practices and a vast body of acquis communautaire that were developed gradually, as an answer to the establishment of a single European market and the area of free movement of people, goods, services and capital. Therefore, it is understandable that within the Serbian state administration and law enforcement agencies there exists a lack of both knowledge and expertise on how to implement these policies.

This is why the EU assistance is crucial, as was the case in the process of drafting the Action Plan for Chapter 24. Namely, a number of EU experts visited Serbia through the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument (TAIEX). In addition, for certain policy areas twinning programs are being implemented, which represent a mechanism for the exchange of knowledge and experience between the EU member states’ administration and their Serbian counterparts.

At this moment, one twinning project on harmonization of the Serbian asylum system with the EU standards is being implemented, with a total value of one million Euros. Finally, during the accession process and after becoming an EU member state, many civil servants will have the opportunity to participate in study and exchange programmes in several EU countries. For instance, Serbian police officers will be able to participate in training programs at the European Police College (CEPOL) and Serbian judicial officials in the European Judicial Training Network. All these exchange opportunities contribute to a more effective and expeditious introduction of the EU standards and best practices.

Serbia does not want to do it on its own

In Serbia, it is evident that there exists a problem with the commitment to reforms. Take police for instance. Since the earliest 3D reform (decentralization, demilitarization, and depoliticization), initiated by OSCE in early 2000’s, the police has constantly been in the process of reform, one way or another. The last reform, initiated in 2014, started with the announcements of introducing a proper human resources management system, as well as the adoption of the new Law on Police that came into power in January 2016.

The Screening Report for Chapter 24, as well as Progress Report, identifies that the Serbian police lacks analytical capacities, has an over-bloated administration and that it has largely failed to adapt itself and its way of work to the needs of the society. Politicization of police remains an especially serious problem or, more precisely, the influence politics wields on the operational police work and the abuse of police by the ruling political parties. If taken into account that the police represent one of the main sources of power, it is clear that no political party is eager to voluntarily let it go. Of course, no one expects from the EU to singlehandedly resolve this Gordian police knot, but it can definitely be relied upon as an ally to those who try to solve this issue.

What after Opening the Chapter?

On the day when Chapter 24 was opened, the Common Negotiating Position of Serbia and the EU on this chapter was presented. This is a legally binding document that makes Serbia obliged towards the EU to implement a comprehensive set of reforms in line with the Action Plan for Chapter 24. The Negotiating Position also contains interim benchmarks, namely the ways the EU will use to assess whether Serbia fulfils conditions for further progress in this chapter. In essence, these are the next target Serbia needs to reach in order to showcase its devoted implementation of the reforms contained in the Action Plan.

As long as the negotiations are opened, the EC and member states will monitor to what extent Serbia upholds its obligations. Special attention will be devoted to monitoring the state of play on the ground, with the aim to assess whether a hyper-production of legislation is taking place or there is an actual positive impact, the so-called positive track record. Unsatisfactory progress in this chapter, as well as in the ones on the judiciary and fundamental rights (Chapter 23) and normalization of relations with Pristina (Chapter 35), can suspend the negotiations on all other chapters at any given time.