Integrity Testing

Integrity testing could potentially be misused as it involves deception, entrapment and provocation. This is why it is necessary to be legally regulated.

By Saša Djordjević (BCSP)

Imagine an inspector with Internal Affairs who, pretending to be an ordinary member of the public, ‘accidentally’ leaves their wallet in a police station. This is followed by an application of measures for covert data collection to establish which police officers have corrupt tendencies and which behave ethically. This is a random integrity test, using a concealed camera. Although such tests have been announced for three years, it has never been explained what form the tests will take: will they target already suspected officers or will they be a random test for all officers.

Last week the introduction of such testing was again announced. And again the how and why remain unclear. There has been no discussion of its introduction, and the testing could potentially be misused as it involves deception, entrapment and provocation. This is why the testing needs to be legally regulated. Such testing should be subject to the same legal restrictions that apply for special investigative techniques, such as phone tapping.

According to the European Convention on Human Rights, integrity testing should be regulated by primary legislation rather than secondary legal acts or administrative practices. This would require the removal of the current provision in the Law on the Police, which states that these methods of oversight are “prescribed more closely by the Minister”.

It should also be a requirement to obtain judicial approval before initiating such testing. Such measures should only be applied when other investigative measures are not sufficient to obtain evidence of corruption, and only in cases where the corruption is a criminal offence. Moreover, the target of such testing should, once it is complete, be informed that they have been subject to such measures.

Integrity tests should be executed by a body impeccable institutional integrity and autonomy, which is not the case in Serbia. The testing is intended to be carried out by the Police Internal Affairs Sector (PIAS).

The autonomy of the Internal Affairs Sector is compromised by the Minister’s power to hand PIAS cases to other units. Furthermore, the main task of the PIAS is to oversee the activities of police officers and not all employees of the Ministry of Interior. This creates two inter-related problems concerning the implementation of integrity testing: the possibility of the Minister preventing its application against a specific police officer and the impossibility of applying the testing to all Ministry of Interior employees.

There is currently in Serbia no legal basis for the admission of evidence gathered through integrity testing in court or as grounds for disciplinary action. Besides the lack of a legal framework, the PIAS also lacks the capacity to conduct testing. The department for covert audio-visual recording at the PIAS does not have sufficient personnel, nor does it have the technical capacities required for integrity testing. This means the PIAS would have to borrow equipment from the Criminal Force Directorate (until resources from foreign donors arrive), which becomes a problem if the target of the testing is from this sector of the police.

Along with a regulative framework for integrity testing, it is also vital that any doubts about the integrity PIAS itself are also resolved. Police officers are of the opinion that those employed by the PIAS are under-qualified and lack credibility, having arrived at their positions thanks to links with political parties. This hard line stance can be interpreted in two ways: as a natural distrust of those tasked with ‘hunting down’ other police officers or as a statement of fact that the state of affairs really is that bad.

The article was originally published on internet portal Peščanik.