This draft Law on Police does not specify the manner of control of Serbian police officers’ assets.
By Saša Djordjević (BCSP)
Last year the attention of the Serbian public was drawn to a ‘forbidden city’ run by the police. Allegedly, a group of police officers were building houses in the Ovča suburb of Belgrade. The media then reported that a high-ranking police officer was using unlawfully acquired money to erect buildings in Nikšić and on the island of Sveti Stefan. Thus far, these have yet to reach an epilogue. Nevertheless, corruption in the police does exist. This is evident from the number of corruption cases and from public perceptions of police corruption. Over the past year, the police Internal Affairs Sector filed 160 criminal charges against police officers, for various abuses. According to the latest research conducted by the OSCE Mission in Serbia, almost half the Serbian public (47 percent) believe the police to be largely or mostly corrupt. A third of those polled were undecided.
The Ministry of Interior recognises that police corruption is a problem the resolution of which must be a priority. This can only be a good thing. Therefore, the draft of the Law on the Police (Article 244) empowers the Internal Affairs Sector to execute “asset checks and checks of changes to asset status”. This provision of the draft law only makes it clear who is responsible for such checks (the Internal Affairs Sector) but does not specify the manner of their implementation, nor is supplementary regulation foreseen for this area. This is clearly not a good thing. It is imperative that the content of new anti-corruption measures be specified for reasons of legal clarity and practical implementation.
The law should prescribe whose property is subject to controls and checks. There are three possibilities. The draft of the Law on the Police envisages that the Internal Affairs Sector checks the property of all those employed by the Ministry of Interior, including police officers and civil servants. If this is the intended solution, it involves checking the property of nearly 45,000 employees. Another interpretation is that the checks will apply only to personnel with police powers, which involves checks on around 24,000 police officers. The third possibility is that the checks will apply to those employees with police, official and special powers, in accordance with the new division of powers under the draft law. The number of employees is, in this case, impossible to determine because official and special powers are novelties introduced by the draft law itself.
The Internal Affairs Sector currently employs about 90 people, which means that proper checks in all of the above three scenarios is practically impossible. Furthermore, there is a risk that asset checks become an empty bureaucratic exercise that does not contribute to reducing police corruption. During public discussion of the draft law, the notion that the Internal Affairs Sector would execute asset checks on high-ranking officers was mentioned. However, the draft law makes no mention of this. If this was the intention – and it is a worthy one – the ranks this would affect should be specified (in accordance with Article 163 of the draft law). In the best case scenario, the Ministry would have determined in advance which positions are at greatest risk of corruption and these would be subject to Internal Affairs checks.
It is crucial that the draft law specifies who should keep records on police officer assets and how these records should be kept. The notion of asset checks implies that employees will be obliged to declare their assets and income at specified intervals, usually annually, to a specified unit or department. There are three possible interpretations here too. The first is that Internal Affairs can keep records and check whether there have been any changes to the financial status of employees, as well as the reasons for any change. Another possibility is that departments for the control of lawful police work within the 27 police departments in Serbia are to be responsible for keeping these records and reporting any irregularities to the Internal Affairs Sector, which then determines how to proceed. The third possible interpretation is that a special organisation or unit will be established within the Ministry and will be responsible for keeping records on officers’ assets.
During public discussion of the draft law, the issue of who will be responsible for these records was not discussed. The best possible solution is that Internal Affairs be directly responsible for keeping records and making checks but that it coordinates its activities with the Anti-Corruption Agency, which already maintains similar records. It should be clearly specified what data is to be included in asset declarations. From the draft law it is only possible to ‘imagine’ what data Ministry of Interior employees will be asked to submit. The assumption is that, in addition to their personal details, the declarations will include data on the employee’s income and assets, such as their income, bank statements and inventories of movable and fixed assets. Public discussion of the draft law did throw up any questions about this but representatives of the Ministry of Interior failed to give concrete responses. It is also not known whether officer’s spouses will be obliged to declare their assets.
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In addition to uncertainties regarding the content of asset declarations, there is a problem with how this data is to be used. There is, hypothetically, a chance that, in order to disgrace an employee of the Ministry of Interior, a media campaign will be launched against them without an official investigation being launched or any suggestion that their assets or property were acquired unlawfully. This is especially problematic if the asset declarations are to be made fully or partially public (which is also unclear at this stage). This leaves space open for various interpretations of how a police officer acquired their assets.
The article was originally published by daily newspaper Danas.


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